

20

AD-A266 911



DTIC
ELFCTE
JUL 12 1993
S A D

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport, R.I.

OPERATIONAL ART AND THE MARINE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE (MEF)

Submitted by

Lieutenant Colonel Peter D. Kopf, USMC
(Seminar #6)

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature

18 June 1993

Paper directed by
Captain H. Ward Clark, Jr., USN
Chairman, Joint Military Operations Department

This document has been approved
for public release and sale; its
distribution is unlimited.


93 7 09 07 2

93-15690



5984

DISCLAIMER NOTICE



THIS DOCUMENT IS BEST
QUALITY AVAILABLE. THE COPY
FURNISHED TO DTIC CONTAINED
A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF
PAGES WHICH DO NOT
REPRODUCE LEGIBLY.

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

1a. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED		1b. RESTRICTIVE MARKINGS	
2a. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY		3. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF REPORT DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION IS UNLIMITED.	
2b. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE		5. MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)	
4. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)		7a. NAME OF MONITORING ORGANIZATION	
6a. NAME OF PERFORMING ORGANIZATION OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT	6b. OFFICE SYMBOL (If applicable) C	7b. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)	
6c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code) NAVAL WAR COLLEGE NEWPORT, R.I. 02841		9. PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER	
8a. NAME OF FUNDING/SPONSORING ORGANIZATION	8b. OFFICE SYMBOL (If applicable)	10. SOURCE OF FUNDING NUMBERS	
8c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)		PROGRAM ELEMENT NO.	PROJECT NO.
		TASK NO.	WORK UNIT ACCESSION NO.
11. TITLE (Include Security Classification) OPERATIONAL ART AND THE MARINE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE (MEF) (U)			
12. PERSONAL AUTHOR(S) LtCol Peter D. Kopf USMC			
13a. TYPE OF REPORT FINAL	13b. TIME COVERED FROM TO	14. DATE OF REPORT (Year, Month, Day) 93/05/17	15. PAGE COUNT 58
16. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTATION A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Operations. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.			
17. COSATI CODES		18. SUBJECT TERMS (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)	
FIELD	GROUP	SUB-GROUP	
		Operational Art, MEF, MAGTF, Operational Design, JTF, Warfighting, Functions Integration & Synchronization	
19. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number) Recent regional contingencies involving Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTF) have increasingly pointed to the need for the Fleet Marine Force (FMF) to embrace the concepts and fundamentals related to not only the tactical level, but the additional capability to assimilate the tenets of the operational level of war. The concepts and doctrine related to the MEF headquarters fully embellishing the notions of operational art remains in the formulative stages. General Gray's primer on the subject, in the form of <u>FMFM 1-1 Campaigning</u> , was the opening shot related to this initiative. It was a good point of departure, but a long way from resolving the thorny issues which currently inhibit the MEF full implementation of interactive skills at the operational level.			
20. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF ABSTRACT <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> UNCLASSIFIED/UNLIMITED <input type="checkbox"/> SAME AS RPT. <input type="checkbox"/> DTIC USERS		21. ABSTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED	
22a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL CHAIRMAN, OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT		22b. TELEPHONE (Include Area Code) 841-3414	22c. OFFICE SYMBOL C

OPERATIONAL ART AND THE MARINE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE (MEF)

Beyond this renaissance amongst the naval services and the evolution of developing concepts related to the deployment and employment of Naval Expeditionary Forces, there has been the Marine Corps' introduction and linkage to the planning and execution of campaigns at the operational level of war. Recent regional contingencies involving Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTF) have increasingly pointed to the need for the Fleet Marine Force (FMF) to embrace the concepts and fundamentals related to not only the tactical level, but the additional capability to assimilate the tenets of the operational level of war.

or	
21	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	<input type="checkbox"/>
d	<input type="checkbox"/>
Ability Codes	
ail and/or Special	

missions resulting in MEF designation as the headquarters lead for a Joint Task Force (JTF) has commensurately elevated staff preparation and planning to the operational level and the persuasion of its associated art. The future potential for the MEF either as the forward element of a JTF, as the JTF headquarters designee, or the service component under the operational control (OPCON) of a higher headquarters in a theater of war or operations may also present the environment for operational planning.²

The concepts and doctrine related to the MEF headquarters fully embellishing the notions of operational art remains in the formative stages. General Gray's primer on the subject, in the form of FMFM 1-1, Campaigning, was the opening shot related to this initiative. It was a good point of departure, but a long way from resolving the thorny issues which currently inhibit the full implementation of the MEFs interactive skills at the operational level. This is by far no small task or trivial initiative, as the implications are complex and open to formidable discussion and debate. Nonetheless, efforts need to be quickened to stem what remains a noteworthy shortfall.

In framing the expanse of operational art and its intricate design for the Marine Corps, there remains the looming question of where the balance lies in formulating specific guidelines, and oppositely, those aspects which should be broadly articulated with the understanding that they will be best interpreted by the commander and staff as the situation dictates. Operational art presents unique planning considerations which require a trained

and experience mind to enact. Future foreign contingencies (and potentially domestic) involving the FMF and any of the three standing MEF command elements (CE) may not furnish the luxury of lead time to conduct the full extent of deliberate operational and tactical planning, as was the case in Desert Storm.

A foundation of operational principles or a "how to" approach may need to be more definitively outlined to enable the MEF staff to quickly and effectively function in a crisis action role. Integral to this theme is the necessity for a malleable framework to fully integrate and synchronize MEF operational functions. This initiative would serve to reinforce the MEF CE as an operational and tactical warrior in the mixture of organizational and spectrum of conflict variations that may be encountered. To adequately envelop the parameters of MEF operational art, it is important to outline the past and current factors which influence this issue and then postulate on a plausible design.

PREFACE

The investigation and development of this topic revealed that the Marine Corps hasn't exactly jumped with both feet into the complex issues surrounding the realm of the operational level of war and the associated impact on the MEF. There are any number of reasons one could conclude as contributing to this distraction. Included among the laundry list of potential overshadowing issues have been the current downsizing of the Marine Corps, base closures, the DOD dilemma surrounding roles and missions, the sizable active and reserve participation in Desert Shield/Storm, gays and homosexuals in the military, the recent reorganization of the Marine Corps Combat Development Command (concept and doctrine nerve center), and the quandary stemming from the enhancement of the MEF command element (CE), an outgrowth of the Force Structure Planning Group (FSPG).¹

At the other end of the scale remains those officers who are unwilling or hesitant to accept that a MAGTF will oversee anything other than the command and control activities related to the tactical level of war. In certain instances this belief may be rooted from a general lack of knowledge related to operational art in conjunction with the future roles of the MEF and further solidified by 200 plus years of institutionalized warfighting history. The appeal of whipping a foe through operational art just doesn't have the same attraction to some Marines as one might conceive as the art of closing with and destroying. Also hidden in this equation is the reluctance on the part of some officers to dedicate the time and brain energy to integrate

operational art as a way of thinking. The old proverb of "teaching the old dog new tricks" may be an appropriate reflection in this instance.

Arguably, the strongest basis for operational thought in the Marine Corps generally stems from TLS and ILS graduates who have been exposed to the subject in recent years through the curriculum at the various service colleges and the National Defense University. The use of FMFM 1-1. Campaigning as a learning tool in many of these schools may suggest that the Corps has this operational realm of understanding and execution concepts fully within its grasp. This unfortunately is far from the truth and this publication largely remains the one and only of its kind dedicated to the operational craft.² Although a concise and truly landmark document, it realistically captures only the tip of the iceberg on the subject.

As a follow-on to school attendance being a catalyst for operational thought within the Marine Corps, this progression of thinking has also been reinforced over the years by the staffing of the various unified and specified CinC headquarters. A two or three year tour as a staff member at one of these headquarters is also an education unto itself. The Joint Staff has likewise attacked the subject with a collection of well written Joint Pubs which have if nothing else provided food for thought and a foundation to build upon for the CinCs, services and in some instances, government agencies.³

The Army has largely been the front runner concerning the issue with the introduction of AirLand Battle (ALB) in 1982.⁴

The Marine Corps' roots concerning the operational level only extends back three years to 1990. Operational art for the Marine Corps represents a tough challenge within the context of it being a fairly complex subject and requiring more than the overnight consumption of a publication. Additive to this higher focus is the accompanying need for the Corps to get its internal house (or tactical domain) in order through the development of concepts related to the integration and synchronization of MAGTF functions pertaining to the major subordinate elements (MSE).

The primary focus of this paper surrounds the higher plateau of operational design which will actuate the machinery for the MAGTF to negotiate the fulfillment of strategic aims. It cannot be dismissed, however, that the two levels are securely interrelated. The development of concepts which will translate this operational vision into a living breathing entity will require an extreme degree of open mindedness, critical examination and possibly a revision of the current methodology for designing MAGTF concepts and doctrine.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER	PAGE
ABSTRACT	ii
PREFACE	v
I ASSEMBLY AREA.....	1
COMMANDANT'S VISION.....	1
TACTICAL COMFORT ZONE.....	3
II LINE OF DEPARTURE.....	7
MAGTF SUPPORT OF THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL.....	7
ADVENT OF USMC OPERATIONAL ART.....	9
FSPG AND THE MEF.....	12
OPERATIONAL CONTINUUM AND REGIONAL WAR PLANNING.....	14
AXIS OF ADVANCE.....	16
ARMY WARFIGHTING DOCTRINE.....	16
ROLE OF THE MEF AT THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL..	18
USMC OPERATIONAL ART AND MANEUVER WARFARE.	20
FINAL COORDINATION LINE.....	22
NAVAL EXPEDITIONARY FORCE CAMPAIGNING.....	22
MEF CAMPAIGN CONSIDERATIONS.....	25
OPERATIONAL DESIGN, PLANNING AND EXECUTION.....	27
III OBJECTIVE SEIZURE.....	31
APPENDIX I -- ARMY BLUEPRINT OF THE BATTLEFIELD.....	34
II -- FMF WARFIGHTING BLUEPRINT.....	35
III -- FMF OPERATING SYSTEM FUNCTIONS.....	36
IV -- SPECTRUM OF CONFLICT AND FMF WAR- FIGHTING BLUEPRINT INTERFACE.....	42
NOTES	43
BIBLIOGRAPHY	48

OPERATIONAL ART AND THE MARINE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE (MEF)

CHAPTER I

ASSEMBLY AREA

Commandant's Vision

With the release of FMFM 1-1, Campaigning in January 1990, General Gray introduced the Marine Corps to the operational level of war. The twofold purpose behind this doctrinal publication was to imbue Marines with the basic tenets of a MAGTF (Marine Air-Ground Task Force) conducting a campaign or supporting a higher headquarters that is charged with executing at the operational level of war.¹ The latter thought wasn't an especially new concept, as Marines at the tactical level have for over 200 years supported numerous Navy or Army commands in war or conflict that were charged with gaining operational results. Although it wasn't referred to as the operational level until recently, the concept offered a recognized way of marshalling and effectively focusing combat power toward the attainment of strategic aims.² What was a new outgrowth of this aspect, however, was the emphasis on Marines bearing the requisite knowledge and experience to fully participate and positively influence the development of higher headquarters campaign plans.

This isolates the initial purpose which embellished the novel vision of future MAGTFs assuming the role of executing campaign plans at the operational level of war. At the time of issuance, it was conceived that either a Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) or a MEF would fall in this category. In the forward, General Gray indicated that the FMFM was intended to be "descriptive,

rather than prescriptive in nature."³ There is no argument on this point. The document was clearly informative and provided a line of demarkation on the subject. The initial impact of the publication reaching the field was similar to that of FMFM 1, Warfighting which had been released a year prior. All Marines who could get their hands on a copy digested it fairly quickly. Yet, the concepts contained in FMFM 1, Warfighting were already familiar to most Marines, as maneuver warfare had been a topic of considerable discussion and writing since the early 80's. An additive factor of this text on maneuver warfare was its audience appeal toward relatively new tactical considerations. Essentially, the document reinforced in writing what many Marines had been exposed to in Marine Corps schools, countless lectures, discussions, heated debates and articles on the subject.

The influence of FMFM 1-1, Campaigning brought about an interesting phenomenon resulting in commands throughout the Marine Corps (FMF, non-FMF, Bases, Stations, etc.) quickly getting on the bandwagon and drafting campaign plans for a host of seemingly important reasons. In hindsight this was all well and fine, as it provided focus and positively invoked Marines to examine and conduct detailed planning for a number of key issues which generally entailed long range projects or programs. The strategic aims which ordinarily provide the thrust for campaign planning were in some cases loosely interpreted or down played in the vigor of the effort.

Since its release, one of the primary themes for which it was intended, namely to focus on the development of a MAGTFs

capability to plan and execute at the operational level of war, has unfortunately been held in a state of suspension and has encouraged little in the way of written material. Only a handful of Marine Corps Gazette articles (6 by my count) have since even mentioned the operational level of war or operational art over the last three years.⁴ In the isolated instances the subject has made it into print, it has either been a periphery topic of the the overall composition, an examination of MAGTF involvement in large theoretical terms or has basically been a reinforcement of the FMFM 1-1 theme. One might conclude from this absence of analysis that although a general understanding may exist of what the operational level of war is and what the contents of a campaign plan generally contain, there remains some doubt concerning the basic fundamentals for the detailed preparation and planning which encompasses this level of war and how it applies to the MEF.

The dimension of concepts and supporting doctrine which frames a MAGTF's capability to function at the operational level of war is at the moment not a tower of strength. This subject by far isn't an easy nut to crack; in many instances, those who have tried to put their arms around this initiative have come to recognize the enormity and multiplicity of the task.

Tactical Comfort Zone

In an attempt to further frame the overall context of the challenge the Corps faces in assimilating the operational level of war and the evolutionary thought process it consumes, it is also necessary to speculate on a segment of the Marine population

which considers the FMF to exclusively be a tactically oriented instrument. There is much to be said about the Marine Corps' long standing fighting tradition which has reflected this primary orientation of combat power application.⁵ The foundation of Marine doctrine, education and training has uninterruptedly focused on what the Corps' operating forces have always done best- carrying the fight to the enemy in the form of engagements, battles and major operations. The Corps' history is replete with occasions where Marine commands in what we refer to today as an OPCON status reported to an Army or Navy higher headquarters which provided the guidance and direction which linked tactical forays to the overall strategic aims via operational objectives.

This posture is even more pronounced when one considers that until recently the Marine Corps was chiefly limited to a tactical role due to the tailoring of the MEF CE. The MEF CE, through self-induced restrictions, was restrained from providing little more than administrative oversight rather than warfighting direction. This instance didn't always settle well with MEF commanding generals and in the mid-80s Lieutenant General Cheatham, CG I MEF, with the recognized shortfalls nonetheless attempted to promote the MEF as a warfighter through staff field exercises.⁶

There were other instances of similar initiatives, but the fact remained that MEF CE was considered to be a behind the scenes player with little more than apportionment and allocation responsibilities. By default the other major subordinate commands essentially looked to the division as the lead and

thereby keeping tactics as the pivotal orientation. The standing MEB CE (recently eliminated by the FSPG⁷) was considered by many to be the warfighter, although requiring considerable augmentation from the MEF CE to fulfill this role. With the MEF CE upgrade, an internal turf battle is also brewing over the shift or encroachment on major subordinate element (MSE) functional responsibilities.

From a joint perspective Marines were previously not considered to have enough experience at commanding large organizations above the tactical level, mainly due to limited opportunities to gain such skills. Had the Marine Corps not ventured in to the realm of promoting the MEFs capability for assuming a JTF role,⁸ the forces against broaching the operational level might well have presented a stronger argument. Yet, with the downsizing of the U.S. military, the essentiality of jointness and the corollary potential for a MAGTF to be the lead landward element under a CinC or JTF within a theater, it remains appropriate for the MEF to look beyond the tactical level of war. Hence, by DOD force planning implications and service self-determination, the MEF has been cast as a capable candidate for subsuming the means to operate at both the tactical and operational levels of war.

The Marine Corps' affinity to tactics and this level of war is also a remarkable segment of the strategic culture which accounts for a select number of officers currently on active duty.⁹ The Vietnam experience continues to linger as fixture for the manner in which that particular war was fought on the ground, in the air

and was supported from rear bases. While some of the dogma from that era has over the course of years faded, the memories and ingrained thoughts of the Marine Corps' role in small unit battles will forever remain. In no sense is this suggestive that all Vietnam veterans should close their minds to this period, but instead to continue to apply the lessons of the past to today's challenges and the transitional role of the MEF in future regional warfare.

CHAPTER II

LINE OF DEPARTURE

MAGTF Support of the Operational Level of War

During the pivotal doctrinal development period of 1933-34 at Quantico, Virginia, the Marine Corps formulated the basis for amphibious theory and with it the embryo of what came to be recognized as the current day Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF).¹ Early efforts related to doctrine formulation recognized the need for an organizational structure which stressed teamwork and the concentration of the various complementary components of combat power. As a warfighting asset, the Fleet Marine Force (FMF) materialized as the landward extension of naval forces. From this historical outgrowth emerged the Third and Fifth Marine Amphibious Corps which provided Admiral Nimitz with the forcible entry capability which proved indispensable in the seizure of Japanese strongholds during the Central Pacific island hopping campaigns. From the assault on Guadalcanal in 1942, through the 1945 seizure of Okinawa, the Marine Corps focus was primarily oriented to the attainment of the operational objectives as a tactical warfighting instrument.

The deployment and employment of the First Provisional Marine Brigade to Korea in 1950 marked the continued utility of the MAGTF concept. Following the landing at Inchon and throughout the remainder of the Korean conflict, the tactically oriented First Marine Division served under the OPCON of the Tenth Army Corps which fell under the Eight Army.² Although Marine

aviation continued to support the divisions's ground operations, the lack of a MAGTF headquarters interrupted the command and control linkage of air-ground forces, a concept which didn't reappear in battle until the introduction of U.S. forces in Southeast Asia.³ In Vietnam, the Third Marine Amphibious Force (MAF) was assigned as a major subordinate command under the OPCON of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV).⁴ Although never designated, the Commander of MACV was in reality a theater of operations CinC with operational level planning and execution responsibilities.⁵ Assigned with cognizance over the I Corps, the MAF exercised OPCON over U.S. (USMC and USA) forces situated in the northern most province of South Vietnam. The primary focus of III MAF (although a field army in character⁶) throughout the conflict centered on a tactical orientation with oversight of the planning for major ground operations.

Through the mid-1970's and 1980's the forward deployed Marine Expeditionary Units (MEU) were the primary MAGTF organization involved in a variety of worldwide contingencies with other naval forces, but always in support of a higher headquarters which was focused on the equivalent of the operational level of war. With the evolution of the MEU Special Operations Capable (SOC) designation this organization took on a life of its own and became the overshadowing expeditionary centerpiece. The six standing MEB CEs through the 1980's also retained a less visible, but important role as a contingency planner and regular exercise participant. Annual joint exercises involving the MEF if nothing else dramatized the limitations of its headquarters which

required sizable augmentation and often at the expense of the major subordinate commands (MSC).⁷

With the inception of maneuver warfare in the early 1980's, the Marine Corps sharpened its tactical teeth and officers at all levels were enlightened to the various supporting theories which stemmed from a host of historical examples. Interestingly, during this same period the Army was a step ahead and gearing up for Air-Land Battle and the new concepts emanating from the added designation of the operational level of war.

In a realistic sense, as the smallest service in the DOD structure, the Marine Corps has since the 1940's represented a multidimensional warfighting capability which could be unleashed in the littoral regions of the world or conduct sustained land combat and through direction could forward the attainment of national strategic goals.⁸ Designs on performing more than this tactical role were not a lucrative factor during the cold war, particularly with the Army's entrenchment in the European theater and response to isolated contingencies generally being limited to the naval services. With the ongoing review of service wide roles and missions and the potential elimination of overlap, the joint theme has surfaced efforts toward the attainment of capabilities which may have previously been an inconsequential matter.

Advent of Operational Art

The summer following General Gray's release of FMFM 1-1, Campaigning, the Marine Corps confronted its first real challenge involving the auspices of engaging at the tactical level and

direct linkage to planning at operational level of war and its associated art. Deployment of I MEF to Saudi Arabia in the summer of 1991 accounted for the first instance in which a MEF CE would serve as both the true warfighting headquarters of a MAGTF and also as a service component under a unified CinC structure. One could probably debate whether I MEF may have cracked the execution barrier at the operational level also, as the elimination of Iraqi troops from the country of Kuwait and seizure of Kuwait City subsumed the attainment of major strategic objectives.

The Marine Corps' emergence from Desert Shield/Storm, involving 100,000 Marines and sailors drew rave reviews and exposed to public consumption that years of deployment related efforts paid off in the outcome of quickly transporting combat equipment and personnel to Saudi Arabia. Once firmly situated on the ground and behind the scenes though, the eventual transition to the offense and the addition of another MEF's worth of combat assets exposed the complexity of playing ball with large forces and the big league implications of theater warfare. Both tactical and operational considerations were intermingled with the joint and combine nature of events. Dedicated staff planning efforts in many functional areas furnished the realization of new ground being explored.⁹ In some cases, areas were ignored due to lack of foresight (i.e. EPOWs) or inability to come up with a plausible solution (i.e. AOA vs TAOR). Without the long lead time which permitted the planning efforts related to the accomplishment of CinCent's strategic aims, and the fighting of

multiple divisions, wings and FSSGs, the Marine Corps may have been caught flat footed.

Since Desert Storm, several MEFs have been tapped as JTFs (Sea Angel-Bangladesh and Restore Hope-Somalia) and have directly faced the challenges of preparation and planning at the operational level.¹⁰ Amongst the services jockeying for position in retaining manpower assets, validating equipment buys and fortifying future roles and missions, it has become increasingly apparent that solicitation for JTF designation bears strong promotional implications and is therefore a highly sought commodity. The Marine Corps has joined this unique club by highlighting the MEFs unique command and control capability and inherent expeditionary nature as a qualifying aspect for JTF headquarters designation.¹¹ While outwardly all of these descriptive considerations are essentially true, the fact remains that MEF currently lacks a full JTF capability by way of a hollow conceptual and doctrinal base which encroaches the basic fundamentals for assuming this degree of planning and associated execution.

How then could it be that the Marine Corps pulled off both of these JTF missions with seemingly flying colors? First and foremost, no lack of effort or personal initiative was missing in either of these instances. Secondly, much was learned in both of these low intensity conflict (LIC) evolutions, particularly involving the close interaction that was required with government and private agencies. Yet the MEF staff in the case of Somalia required considerable select augmentation by Marines versed in

the operational level of war and with the know-how surrounding the implications of integrating and synchronizing functions.¹²

The service exposure to the Goldwaters-Nichols Act has been the preeminent factor which has awakened the theme of jointness and the realization that JTFs will tender the logical mechanism for the unified CinC to intervene in future conflicts and contingencies.¹³ A "can do" attitude has been an unmistakable trait which has always played a key dimension in the success that Marines have enjoyed in the past. Operational art also requires this mental attitude, but reliance on this alone will not ensure the acquisition of objectives without the presence of accompanying staff experience and skills.

Force Structure Planning Group (FSPG) and MEF Enhancements

Mentioned briefly earlier was the prior inability of the MEF CE to function as a full fledged warfighter in the context of it lacking a structure which would enable the proper manning for extended operations, along with means to conduct planning related to the employment of combat power at the tactical level.¹⁴ With this realization it isn't hard to decipher the fact that the MEF CE was probably ill disposed to accept a role which also included implications of operational art. Essentially, with the inability of the MEF staff to be a full player in the tactical sense this by default conveyed the onus for the ground combat element (GCE) or division to be the central warfighting entity for the MAGTF.¹⁵ This general assumption was a historical extension of the WW II premise of the division being the tactical element that seized the ground and obtained the realization of higher

headquarters assigned objectives. The contributions of the aviation combat element (ACE) and the combat service support element (CSSE) were therefore largely governed to be supporting in nature to requirements of the GCE.¹⁶

In fall of 1991, the Commandant convened the Force Structure Planning Group (FSPG) which was detailed to develop a force structure which encompassed the programmed downsizing of the Corps along with the consideration of future roles and capabilities which would be applicable to the uncertainty of prospective threats.¹⁷ The principle outgrowth effecting the MEF CE was the upgrade of its structure, thereby energizing the means for absolute command and control over MAGTF activities and as a focal point for integrating and synchronizing the functions and assets of the MSCs. This is largely what I MEF, with sizable personnel augmentation, enacted during Desert Storm.¹⁸ To resolve the issue and burden of service componency at the CinC level, both of the FMF headquarters were likewise chartered by the FSPG with the performing this role at the theater level.¹⁹

Beyond the implications of the MEF CE assuming its proper stance as the warfighting lead of the MAGTF, the omission of this enhancement would have eliminated the MEFs realistic posturing as a JTF designee. With the upgraded manning schedule for the MEF practically a forgone conclusion at this juncture, the gridlock of supporting concepts and doctrine which will inject the means to perform the previously identified headquarters roles remains a factor which lacks resolution.

What the future portends for an entire MEFs involvement in a

theater level contingency, similar to Desert Storm, is an open question for which no legitimate answer exists. The utility of a MEF CE in conjunction with JTF designation and deployment of select portions of this MAGTF may logically loom as a more representative and reappearing capacity that may be confronted. With this as a basic assumption, the decision as to where to focus staff training and exercise time related to MEF operational design must be determined and programmed.

Operational Continuum and Regional War Plans

With the shift from the cold war threat orientation to that of regional contingencies, the unified CinCs face the increasing complexity and burden of preparation for the diversity of worldwide contingencies and conflicts stemming from a host of thorny issues. No theater is currently without its share of ongoing friction, whether it be actual fighting or the trip wire firmly in place.²⁰ Two of the pillars of our current national strategy will heavily implicate the utilization of naval expeditionary forces (NEF). It has become a common theme that the drawdown of overseas bases portends that naval forces will form the crux of regional forward presence and initial crisis response.²¹ With the concurrent downsizing of both the Navy and the Marine Corps, the continuance of forward presence in the manner desired of each CinC remains in considerable jeopardy. Likewise, quick response to contingencies or developing conflicts emanating in the littoral regions of the world will also tax the more limited assets of each of these services, while at the same time both will attempt the balancing act of continued forward

presence elsewhere.

Although low intensity conflict (LIC) appears to be the most likely challenge that introduced U.S. forces will face, the CinC level planning and preparations accorded to the upper tiers of the operational continuum cannot be dismissed. Contingencies such as Desert Storm may rear themselves very infrequently, but the potential for U.S. forces involvement in mid to high intensity conflict (MIC and HIC) range remains an overshadowing outcome of regional strife which cannot be contained and explodes with the participation of multiple countries.

The environment for the standup of JTFs to meet a host of worldwide contingencies remains ripe and with it the requirement for the rapid introduction of forces which through adaptive planning imbue the warfighting capabilities considered necessary for the attainment of national strategic aims. The dexterity that the U.S. military has displayed in recent contingencies has bred the unfortunate, but common belief amongst the American population that intervention of our forces assures a quick, decisive and generally successful conclusion of hostilities or events inclusive of actual conflict. The media has done much to promote this understanding of the seemingly instantaneous and surgical capabilities of the armed forces. The point here is that although there can not be any assurance of this performance in future contingencies, the obligation on the military to perform in a professional and competent manner can never for a moment be abdicated. This leaves future JTFs with the burden of gaining results, reducing collateral U.S. casualties, and

maintaining the balancing act of coordinating with a myriad of directly involved players in consummating ultimate success.

There is little doubt that the dexterity aligned to operational art in this sense is a growth industry,²² as the implications of JTF designation are becoming greater in scope, rather than the opposite. Services which are continually disposed to skillfully fulfilling the enormity of this role will present the theater CinC with the appropriate operational instrument for crisis and contingency resolution. Logically, this prognosis should stimulate the services and particularly their major operating commands to hasten the advancement of requisite skills and proficiency coupled with operational art.

AXIS OF ADVANCE

Army Warfighting Doctrine

Since 1982, with the promulgation of Air-Land Battle (ALB), the Army has lead the way in the formulation of a host of well written publications which have detailed the manner in which soldiers will approach the three levels of war. In doing so the Army had intellectually explored new ground and appropriately diagnosed that at the theater level, an intermediary step was needed to properly amalgamate the strategic and tactical levels. Although there had always been a recognized separation between the two in the Army, the concepts which surrounded the operational level and particularly operational art had never been fully articulated and documented as a formal entity of warfare.²³

A unique aspect of the Army's structure, which has set it

apart and has always been an alien feature to the Marine Corps, is the designation of army groups and field armies which have embodied sizable theater warfighting organizations. Even the concept of a corps level organization for the present is largely a historical Marine memento which now dates back to the WW II era. Recently, the concept of redesignating I MEF as a Marine Expeditionary Corps (MEC) was resurrected during Desert Storm.²⁴ While many similarities exist between a MEF and a corps, the most striking at this juncture in the area of Table of Organization (T/O) is that each of their headquarters structures are closely aligned.²⁵ This was not a coincidence, as the restructuring of the MEF CE was intended to build a staff framework for not only tactical, but also operational planning and execution.

Over the years the Army has continually fine-tuned ALB which was oriented on NATO warfare and has recently revamped this doctrine with the development of FM 100-5 AirLand Operations which has shifted to the focus of regional conflict.²⁶ Linked with Army doctrine, the corps has generally become proficient and well adapted at operating at the operational and tactical levels.

Staff focus at the tactical level (corps and below) centers on the synchronized execution of deep, close and rear operations.²⁷ Closely tied with tactics and the synchronization of activities is Battlefield Operating Systems (BOS) or the functions which provide the framework for staff planning.²⁸ Similar to the tactical level, the Army has developed a parallel tier of operating systems for operational and strategic orientation (corps level and above) which links tactical functions to those

being appraised by higher headquarters. A synopsis of the Army's three functional levels is contained at Appendix I.²⁹

From a strictly land warfare perspective, the Army has intuitively structured its headquarters organizations and C2 design to complement operational art and tactics. The Marine Corps can largely inoculate the Army's approach, but beyond this consideration, it must devise a functional structure which incorporates other unique MAGTF capabilities and the dimension of ordinarily operating from the sea. Therefore, the basic operational functions that a MEF staff will oversee won't vary that much from an Army corps, but the individual dimensions of each function and the manner that they will be planned and executed will differ for a number of distinctive reasons.

Role of the MEF at the Operational Level

With all of the roles and missions for each service presently undergoing the scrutiny of Congress, it is hard to predict where the overlaps in either case may be eliminated. Cost saving portends to be the obvious determining factor, even though the services conclude that certain capability overlaps may be a sound approach. In the end, economic factors will probably overrule. The worldwide contingencies currently being faced today and the predictions of what will characterize those of the future point to the importance of service expeditionary and joint interoperability capabilities. From these pivotal assumptions, service unity of effort should become an enhanced feature relative to contingency and crisis response.

Any attempt to outline all of the potential deployment

situations that a MEF might face would be a fruitless effort and the list would obviously be considerable. Roles that the MEF may be called upon to perform offer a more finite menu, but again the variations would be difficult to fully cover in the confines of this paper. The MEF will in most cases continue to have its roots imbedded in the tactical level of war in future conflict. As the subordinate element of a JTF, or directly linked to a theater or subunified CinC, the MEF will largely dwell in the realm of tactics while concurrently providing support to the joint operational planning process. In this instance, the MEF CE must continue to be cognizant of the commander's intent two levels above and how particularly at the operational level, the MEF's tactical efforts will translate into the accomplishment of operational objectives.³⁰

Shifting gears to the added roles the MEF now confronts dramatizes the complexity of activities which may befall the CE. The MEF will continue to face the potential of JTF designation, interim assignment as a JTF until the arrival of follow-on forces, tasking as a Land Component Commander (LCC) or Air Component Commander (ACC), or tethered with multiple divisions (USMC and USA) which will edge it into the operational planning and execution sphere. There are others possibilities which might also pertain. In the case of Restore Hope, I MEF tapped the First Marine Division as the MarFor (Marine component) and also responsible as the ground combat component (GCC) (tactical lead).³¹ This permitted the MEF CE to concentrate on the JTF functions and the collateral operational level responsibilities.

Not all contingencies will provide the flexibility of this command arrangement.

This postulates that the MEF CE could, as a JTF headquarters shoulder both tactical and operational responsibilities which stem from oversight of the MEF major subordinate commands, assigned service component commands, MarFor component tasks and finally those of JTF considerations. Needless to say, this is a considerable heaping of diverse functions that could consume a MEF CE. Even with the CinC, FMF, individual service, and government augmentation cells added to the headquarters structure, to assist in operational planning and execution, the onus will continue to reside with the MEF commander and staff to integrate and synchronize the various activities. The MEF CE will also play a pivotal role in formulating clear commander's intent, concept of operations, and continual guidance and direction. Perpetual MEF CE preparation for such a challenge presents a litany of formidable tasks which entail where the priority of staff training and education should be dedicated, what SOPs are required, how the MEF maintains the level of competence with a large annual turnover of personnel, who is best qualified to fill certain key billets and a host of other related issues.

USMC Operational Art and Maneuver Warfare

The planning connotations which epitomize operational art may suggest to some that this represents the death nail for maneuver warfare at the tactical level. This misbelief chiefly emanates from the view that the previous tenets of ALB were focused from a

tactical and also operational perspective on a linear battlefield which rigidity embraced strict control measures. While the Marine Corps has assimilated to a degree the separation of the battlefield (deep, close and rear) in a similar manner to the Army, there are variances in philosophy and technological capabilities (i.e. ACE) which denotes differing approaches. Hence, tactical considerations for the MEF commander offer a varied picture from that of an Army corps commander.

Operational maneuver generally entails phased, multi-force movements over a more expansive dimension of time and space than at the tactical level.³² Preparation and planning by a staff charged with strategic aims must translate the use of tactical actions into the collective advancement of these aims. Control of units at the operational level must often be carefully choreographed to bring the proper amount of combat power to bear at the designated time and location. This in no way impedes or limits the maneuver parameters that shape the tactical commanders purview. His formulated intent and concept of operations will support the operational level through the coordination of tactical maneuver and planned fires.³³ The characteristic of maneuver warfare which seek gaps versus the obstacle of surfaces is therefore in no way threatened by the operational considerations.³⁴

Control measures which might be considered to separate the operational and tactical level are generally intended to add simplicity to operations, provide tactical commanders with realistic parameters in which to conduct battle and prevent the

potential for fratricide. It is an inherited responsibility of the staff which is charged with the precept of operational art to deconflict the battlefield and positively channel tactical efforts rather than complicate or add superfluous measures. Maneuver warfare at the tactical level, if anything, is a complementary ingredient which expedites the accomplishment of operational objectives.³⁵

FINAL COORDINATION LINE

Naval Expeditionary Force Campaigning

The commitment of Navy-Marine Corps team to forge ahead with the development of naval expeditionary doctrine related to joint and combined operations in the littoral regions of the world bears the unique brand of the efforts which hastened the advancement of the campaigns in western Pacific in the early 1940's. Synthesis of the Composite Warfare Concept (CWC), amphibious and evolving MAGTF doctrine, and the reference of joint precepts appear to be the crux of the charter facing the Naval Doctrine Center.³⁶

In the past, the Navy had principally channeled its attention toward sea control and overcoming the expected threat on the open ocean.³⁷ The amphibious forces were essentially a stepchild to this concept and remained out of sight until a crisis need arose for power projection ashore. Safe transiting of the major oceans is no longer a primary U.S. military concern and instead the spotlight now resides in the establishment of a controlling influence within 200 miles of the world's coastlines.³⁸ Countless theories abound this issue and more will evolve in the

dynamics of integrating Navy and Marine Corps capabilities and generating the various nodes for coupling with other U.S. and allied forces. Integral to the foundation for NEF participation in joint and combined operations will be the importance of communications and systems interface. Failure to attain C³I linkage will hinder any attempts at unity of effort and further stymie the realization of strategic goals and operational objectives.³⁹

The current forecast of regional strife and the proximity of a large percentage of the world population near coastlines will logically have NEFs disposed as the initial response force on the scene. Campaigning by the NEF will vary in character due to the unique spectrum of situations that will be faced. A common planning thread will ordinarily encompass the requirement to transition combat power ashore while also maintaining control of the seaward battlespace.⁴⁰ Integration and synchronization of assigned sea (surface and subsurface), air and land forces will bear heavily on the attainment of campaign objectives.⁴¹

Initial JTFC responsibilities may originate afloat with either the senior Navy or Marine commander embarked and the appropriate staff assuming the planning responsibilities. It is conceivable that NEF campaigning will be planned and executed by a joint Navy/Marine Corps staff (or NEF Staff) and again, with either a Navy or Marine commander. Potential options for the duration of the crisis will include that the JTF designation remain afloat or transition ashore to another arriving service command or to the MACTF (MEF or MEB) phasing across the beach.

Instances may also have the on-scene NEF assigned in a supporting role in an OPCON status to either a theater CinC or JTF. In this case the embarked Navy and Marine staffs may also embrace an operational and tactical planning role due to caliber of assigned tasks which stem from the more expansive campaign plan. Higher headquarters direction which delineates tasks which are tactical in nature will still require the NEF afloat to lend active operational planning support in the development of campaign plans. The NEF may also be tasked with the requirement to assume JFACC or JFMCC and the collateral air space or maritime management responsibilities accorded to these functional component commands. Again, depending on the duration and magnitude of the crisis, the JFACC function, if initiated afloat, may also transition ashore with the arrival of follow-on forces.

The linkage of the NEF to the sea, air and land assigned tasks represents a unique planning picture which requires the imaginative integration of resources that in the past were in many cases mentally isolated to one of the three elements. Centralized planning and decentralized execution will continue to be the fundamental base for the conduct of NEF campaigns. Intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) at the operational level will require the timely fusion of all sources which will provide the NEF with a complete three-dimensional portrayal of the regional area of operations and particularly the opposition faced.⁴² The various maneuver assets, which are ordinarily a source of strength for a NEF, will provide the commander and staff with the means for decisively interdicting

the opposition plans, tempo and decision cycle. The NEF will above all continue to offer theater CinCs with a flexible, standoff capability that can apply a minimum amount of influence, quickly transition to the weighted application of combat power ashore, and offer the enabling means for the introduction of follow-on forces.⁴³

MEF Campaign Considerations

The MEF will assume an operational role as a campaign planner most often with the designation as a JTF headquarters. Based on current indications, the operating environment of LIC will generally prevail as the likely arena which will encompass the assigned area of operations. Beyond the complexity of normal MAGTF preparation and planning, the MEF CE will be superimposed over other U.S. forces present and the likelihood of coalition warfare will include the necessity to either coordinate with or amalgamate allied military forces. Every instance of a MEF's designation by a theater CinC as JTF will present differing challenges than those encountered in prior deployments. The commonality of basic considerations, however, should provide a foundation for the manner in which campaigns will be typically be conceived and executed.

In most instances, the MEF will as a JTF take its lead from the theater CinC and any Oplans, Conplans or campaign plans that may be on the shelf or in the developmental stage. Initial MEF CE efforts will center on the fusion of participating services and more specifically, individual commands, with the goals of quickly establishing unity of command and a clear line of

communications amongst the various layers of staffs.⁴⁴ MEF reception of planning cells from each of the components must be considered early on as a means for commencing preparations and planning prior to arrival in theater.⁴⁵

Communications augmentation for the MEF will ordinarily be required from Joint Communications Support Element (JCSE) to link the staff to the various participating commands, out of theater supporting commands and the host of U.S. government agencies which formulate the country team.⁴⁶ Liaison officers will also bear heavily in the interactive planning process which will be a continuing initiative between the numerous activities and commands. Liaison teams need to be properly manned, trained and outfitted with the necessary communications equipment.⁴⁷

The MEF CE will bear the onus for delineating the planning cycle for campaign plan development and the sequential continuous staff actions that will be needed to update and revise the execution of operations. Campaigning on this scale will require that the MEF CE be well versed in joint, individual U.S. service and potentially allied service doctrine.⁴⁸ Without this knowledge, the MEF CE will be limited in being able to harness the diverse capabilities that each service brings to the region. Deviations from doctrine will be a JTFC call that will ensure the collective efforts of the force channel toward the desired end state. Planning flexibility must be an integral ingredient to staff actions and the means to quickly shift the main effort toward an exposed opposition vulnerability or center of gravity. The LIC environment also necessitates that intelligence be

rapidly introduced to the planning cycle. Promotion of this decisive element will often make the difference in outclassing the opposition by interdicting his decision cycle and also disrupting plans and operational tempo.⁴⁹

In the end, the operational rubber meets the road and the campaign plan becomes a viable warfighting mechanism with the direct involvement and personal influence of the JTFC. This central individual sets the tone, provides the intent, imbues the staff with guidance and corrals the support of other commands toward the accomplishment of the stipulated objective.⁵⁰

Operational Design, Planning and Execution

As indicated earlier, FMFM 1-1, Campaigning provided a "descriptive" overview of the operational level of war and its associated art. The extent to which the document actually encapsulated the structure for attaining strategic goals was essentially reserved to what could be referred to as the conceptual design of campaigning. The two subordinating designs were also mentioned, which include functional and detailed,⁵¹ but not elaborated upon and generally left for further development. The transition of operational theory (or concept design) into the reality of staff interaction, functions integration and synchronization, and the exacting details of execution toward an identified end state represent the essence of this craft at the grass roots level. These two areas epitomize the current shortfall which precludes the MEF CE from fully translating theory to the useful mechanics of what operational art in the final process produces.

The complexity of the MEF CE conducting planning and overseeing execution at the operational and tactical level requires the staff to continually concentrate on the differing characteristics of each of these levels of war, while also attempting to incorporate both thought processes into a unified system. The difficulty in assimilating the concepts of operational art at the MEF level is frustrated with tactical considerations which will in most cases continue to compete for headquarters staff time and effort. Balancing where the operational and tactical factors fit in the planning equation and the location of the seam which distinguishes art from tactics may at times be difficult to delineate. Military strategic culture exhibits the tendency to constitute specific organizational, staff and individual tasks to provide focus and direction to personnel charged with contingency planning and execution. This is particularly noteworthy in crisis action situations, where lack of a definitive set of apportioned responsibilities and tasks may result in weaknesses in the overall plan and potentially disjointed employment.

The Marine Corps currently lacks a foundation of operating systems which in any way resembles the Army's Blueprint of the Battlefield.⁵² Adoption of this approach, or a similar methodology which embraces unique MAGTF characteristics, would offer a departure point for how operating systems and the abstract of functions could assist in the manner that the MAGTF staff could face the dilemma of concentrating its efforts. This concept would also need to be further developed into a road map

or blueprint which could visually permit the various layers of staffs to track the relationship between tactics and operational art and how they mesh in the overall planning process. A further dimension of any system devised will be the compatability of MEF functions in the joint and combined arena.

Appendix II provides an example of potential FMF operating systems⁵³ and Appendix III follows up with specific MarFor and MEF related functions.⁵⁴ Discriminating between tactical and operational boundaries of these operating systems (whi the Army does) was considered to be detrimental to planning efforts of the MEF.⁵⁵ This is largely based on the previous thought that they are closely interrelated. Institutionalizing these or some other form of operating system would assist in transitioning the MEF from the conceptual design to the practical application of operational art. By delineating the parameters of operational design, the MEF staff will be able to concentrate on the mechanics of integrating and synchronizing the functions. This will also promote the last step of this process, which centers on the detailed coordination of individual functions that will feed the execution of the concept of operations.

The Joint Pub 5-00.2, Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures includes comprehensive checklists for JTF and the individual joint staff section responsibilities. What has been overlooked in this menu is the realization that all functions are interwoven amongst the JTF staff sections and are not planning fixtures that receive isolated attention. Cohesive operational planning must embrace the calculated interaction of all involved

to produce a comprehensive campaign plan which tracks toward desired objectives. Directly linked with this prerequisite is the added need to fuse the CinC, subordinate, component, and supporting staffs that are also integral to the staff planning process.⁵⁶ To ignore the importance of a systematic approach or isolate specific functions would promote the stovepiping of collateral JTF planning and restrict the climate for the integration and synchronization of actions of the total force.

The corresponding functions of each operating system must also be considered and shaped in conjunction with the variety of settings which stem from the spectrum of conflict. Appendix IV illustrates the graphics of this relationship and some potential considerations that might be examined in each instance.⁵⁷

Similar to the operating playbooks found at the MEU level, a parallel concept of operational design which overlays functions with the aspects of HIC through LIC would provide the MEF CE with a basis for structuring the planning profile for each contingency response. The offshoot of this approach would be a handy reference that would depict the "descriptive" envelop of operational design. As a tool it might assist in overcoming gaps in artistic talent and enhance the cumulative reaction to quickly materializing crisis and contingency situations.

CHAPTER III

OBJECTIVE SEIZURE

Response to future regional contingencies currently has all of services determining, in an analytical manner, the appropriate methodology for channeling individual warfighting capabilities toward the projected recurring needs of the unified CinCs. Unfortunately, world events won't remain at a standstill until all of the services can give a profound thumbs up that they are fully mission capable for the assortment of tasks which are bounded by the operational continuum.

The operational level of war and more finitely its associated art have come to the forefront by recent overseas friction as a pivotal equation that will imbue increasing significance. The structure of operational art up to now has been relatively open ended with few hard and fast requirements and no formal checklist which will ensure success. The varied skills associated with this unique military derivative must be likened to those of most master craftsman. A balanced blend of years of experience reinforced with the continual enhancement of knowledge provide the framework for this unique facility of the profession of arms. Operational art is an interwoven imperative the theater CinCs, standing JTFs and service component level commands must continually practice and fine-tune to perform.

Beyond the basic individual talents that operational art requires, a simplistic, yet encompassing framework must exist for a staff to channel its energies towards the identified operational objective. Without a common focus or blueprint which

overlays staff activities, the individual skills, no matter how great, will in the aggregate enthusiasm diminish the unity of effort related to a crisis or contingency response. The continuous turnover of staff personnel within the MEF CE will portend that some will be less prepared than others in the preparation and planning that surrounds a MEFs involvement at the operational level. Based on this factor, it is sensible that the operational tools produced be more detailed in character or more "prescriptive" than what may have previously been perceived as best left as broad and generally descriptive in content.

The challenges which surround the vision of integrating operational art and tactical thought require that imaginative and aggressive Marines be placed in the key staff billets which are entrusted with this requirement. It is conceivable that the most capable colonels and lieutenant colonels will no longer be destined for the command of regiments, groups, battalions or squadrons and instead find themselves on MEF staffs. This thought in no way diminishes the importance or contributions of the small unit level and the realm of combat and tactics. Nonetheless, the tactical level of war will present the least demanding chore in comparison to the challenges of tangling with the complexity of operational art and the MEFs involvement.

As a military institution which exemplifies the profession of arms, the Marine Corps must get beyond any misconception that operational art is an elementary, unscholarly concept which is relegated solely to the action of staff officers in our MEF CEs. Commanders and staff sections within the various MSCs must also

be capable of active participation in operational scheme. Unrealistic assumptions that the mechanics of a campaign plan is in any way an uncomplicated and by the numbers drill needs to be dismissed. Our recent successes in heading JTFs should also not paint the picture that our MEFs are fully capable to perform this role. Writing operational checks without a solid design reserve is a precarious situation.

The current absence of functional and detailed design detracts from the operational capability which General Gray envisioned and which we have continued to advertise as within the realm of a MEF. Additive to this shortfall is the apparent breakdown in concept and doctrine development related to MACTF activities.¹ There is little doubt that the MEF is well suited for an operational role, but the effort needs to be extended to commute operational theory into the tenets of practical application. Until this becomes an accepted fact, many Marines will continue to assume that what they are doing is in fact operational art, when in reality it may only be scratching the surface of this unique and demanding approach to this level of warfare.

ARMY BLUEPRINT OF THE BATTLEFIELD

STRATEGIC LEVEL BLUEPRINT

NATIONAL MILITARY

- SN.1 FORCE DEVELOPMENT
- SN.2 MOBILIZATION
- SN.3 STRATEGIC DEPLOYMENT
- SN.4 STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE
- SN.5 STRATEGIC DIRECTION AND INTEGRATION
- SN.6 EMPLOYMENT
- SN.7 SUSTAINMENT

THEATER

- ST.1 THEATER FORCE REQUIREMENT AND READINESS
- ST.2 ALLIANCE AND REGIONAL RELATIONS
- ST.3 THEATER STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE
- ST.4 THEATER STRATEGIC DIRECTION AND INTEGRATION
- ST.5 INTRA-THEATER STRATEGIC MOVEMENT AND MANEUVER
- ST.6 THEATER STRATEGIC FIRES
- ST.7 THEATER STRATEGIC PROTECTION
- ST.8 THEATER STRATEGIC SUSTAINMENT

OPERATIONAL LEVEL BLUEPRINT

- OP.1 OPERATIONAL MOVEMENT AND MANEUVER
- OP.2 OPERATIONAL FIRES
- OP.3 OPERATIONAL PROTECTION
- OP.4 OPERATIONAL COMMAND AND CONTROL
- OP.5 OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
- OP.6 OPERATIONAL SUPPORT

TACTICAL LEVEL BLUEPRINT

- TA.1 MANEUVER BOS
- TA.2 FIRE SUPPORT BOS
- TA.3 AIR DEFENSE BOS
- TA.4 COMMAND AND CONTROL BOS
- TA.5 INTELLIGENCE BOS
- TA.6 MOBILITY AND SURVIVABILITY
- TA.7 COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

FLEET MARINE FORCE WARFIGHTING BLUEPRINT (FMF OPERATING SYSTEMS)

HEADQUARTERS FLEET MARINE FORCES

MARFOR/FMF

FORCE DEVELOPMENT & MOBILIZATION (MARFOR 1)	FORCE INTELLIGENCE (MARFOR 2)
FORCE DEPLOYMENT (MARFOR 3)	FORCE OPERATIONS & PLANS (MARFOR 4)
FORCE DIRECTION & INTEGRATION (MARFOR 5)	FORCE SUSTAINMENT (MARFOR 6)

MARINE AIR-GROUND TASK FORCE

MEF(JTF HQ)

JTF REQUIREMENTS & READINESS (JTF 1)	ALLIANCE & REGIONAL RELATIONS (JTF 2)
JTF DIRECTION & INTEGRATION (JTF 3)	JTF COMMAND & CONTROL (JTF 4)
JTF INTELLIGENCE (JTF 5)	JTF MOVEMENT & MANEUVER (JTF 6)
JTF FIRES (JTF 7)	JTF PROTECTION (JTF 8)
	JTF SUSTAINMENT (JTF 9)

MEF/MEF (FWD)/MEB

COMMAND & CONTROL (MEF 1)	INTELLIGENCE (MEF 2)	MOVEMENT & MANEUVER (MEF 3)	AVIATION (MEF 4)
FIRES & FIRE SUPPORT (MEF 5)	MOBILITY & SURVIVABILITY (MEF 6)	COMBAT SUPPORT (MEF 7)	

MEU

COMMAND & CONTROL (MEU 1)	INTELLIGENCE (MEU 2)	MANEUVER (MEU 3)	AVIATION (MEU 4)
FIRE SUPPORT (MEU 5)	MOBILITY & SURVIVABILITY (MEU 6)	COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT (MEU 7)	

MAJOR SUBORDINATE ELEMENTS

GCE (DIV/REGT)

COMMAND & CONTROL (GCE 1)	INTELLIGENCE (GCE 2)	MANEUVER (GCE 3)	AVIATION (GCE 4)
FIRE SUPPORT (GCE 5)	MOBILITY & SURVIVABILITY (GCE 6)	COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT (GCE 7)	

ACE (MAW/MAG)

COMMAND & CONTROL (ACE 1)	INTELLIGENCE (ACE 2)	MANEUVER (ACE 3)	AVIATION (ACE 4)
FIRE SUPPORT (ACE 5)	MOBILITY & SURVIVABILITY (ACE 6)	COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT (ACE 7)	

CSSE (FSSG/BSSG)

COMMAND & CONTROL (CSSE 1)	INTELLIGENCE (CSSE 2)	MANEUVER (CSSE 3)	AVIATION (CSSE 4)
FIRE SUPPORT (CSSE 5)	MOBILITY & SURVIVABILITY (CSSE 6)	COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT (CSSE 7)	

APPENDIX 11

FMM OPERATING SYSTEMS

HEADQUARTERS MARINE FORCES/FLEET MARINE FORCE FUNCTIONS

FORCE DEVELOPMENT AND MOBILIZATION (MARFOR 1)

- FORCE STRUCTURE/ALLOCATION
- USMC RECEPTION CENTER ACTIVITIES
- MANPOWER PLANS & POLICY
- MOBILIZATION PLANS (DEVELOP & EXERCISE)
- MOB MOVEMENT REQMTS

FORCE INTELLIGENCE (MARFOR 2)

- COORDINATE/INTEGRATE THEATER & NATIONAL ASSETS & SUPPORT
 - COLLECTION
 - M,C&G (MAP, CHART & GEODESY) REQMTS
 - METEOROLOGY
 - TARGETING
 - HUMINT
 - IMINT
 - SIGINT/EW
- INTEL PRODUCTION & DISSEMINATION (E.G. THEATER ASSESSMENTS)
- INTEL & TARGETING POLICY
- INTEL REQMT PRIORITIES

FORCE DEPLOYMENT (MARFOR 3)

- STRATEGIC MOBILITY/TRANSPORTATION
 - PORT & TERMINAL OPERATIONS (E.G. SEAPORTS & AIRHEADS)
 - TPFDD/JOPE/JDS/SYSTEMS INTEGRATION
 - LOTS/COTS/MPF
 - RSOM (RECEIVE, STAGE, ONWARD MOVEMENT [TMO])
- COMMAND & CONTROL

FORCE OPERATIONS AND PLANS (MARFOR 4)

- DEVELOPMENT OF OPLANS/CONPLANS/SPTG PLANS & ANNEXES
- MONITORING MAGTF OPS
- DELIBERATE PLANNING
 - WAR TERMINATION
 - CIVIL AFFAIRS/REFUGEES/EVACUEES
 - OPDEC/OPSEC
 - NBC
 - EXTERNAL FIRE SUPPORT
 - AERO-MEDICAL EVAC
 - AVIATION PLANNING/INTEGRATION
 - EPW OPS COORDINATION/PLANNING
- LNOS TO CINC/JTF/ALLIES/COMPONENTS
- AMPHIB OPS/LFOPS (INITIATING DIRECTIVE & CATF/CLF OPS)
- REPORTS (PREPARE/COLLATE/SUBMIT)

FORCE OPERATIONS AND PLANS (MARFOR 4) CONTINUED

COMPONENT COORDINATION (MOU/MOA)
TPFDD/WWWCCS
SECURITY ASSISTANCE COORD
COMPONENT CP (THEATER)

FORCE DIRECTION AND INTEGRATION (MARFOR 5)

JCSE SPT/ADDITIONAL COMM REQMTS
CMS SPT/REQMTS
DCS/NTS LINK
COMM OPS & PLANS (PRIORITIZED & ALLOCATE RESOURCES)
INTEROPERABILITY & SYSTEMS INTEGRATION
FREQUENCY MGMT
SPTG COMM PLANS (ADP, LAN & MAN)

FORCE SUSTAINMENT (MARFOR 6)

LOGISTICS OPS (HNS & SERVICING)
(COMMON/CROSS/JOINT/SINGLE & ISSA)
LOG PLANS (OPLANS/CONPLANS/SPTG PLANS)
HEALTH SERVICES
(MED REG/BLOOD PGM MGMT/ECH OF CARE PLNG)
THEATER SUPPLY MGMT
CONTRACTING
WAR RESERVE (WRSA)
STORAGE
RESUPPLY (CLASSES I, III, V, VIII & IX)
USMC & USN (AVN ORD/SUPPLY)
FACILITY/GENERAL ENGINEERING (CONUS & IN THEATER)
GENERAL SVCS
ADMIN SPT (USMC & USN [PSD])
MORALE SPT (MAIL, PX, CHAPLAIN, USO, ETC.)
LEGAL SPT (LOW, SOFA, ROE, UCMJ, ETC.)
CASUALTY REPLACEMENT
DECEDENT AFFAIRS
PUBLIC AFFAIRS

FMF OPERATING SYSTEMS

MARINE AIR-GROUND TASK FORCE
MEF (JTF HQ) FUNCTIONS

JTF REQUIREMENTS AND READINESS (JTF 1)

WARFIGHTING REQMTS
FORCE DEPLOYMENT REQMTS
FORCE SIZE/STRUCTURE
READINESS REPORTING/STATUS

ALLIANCE AND REGIONAL RELATIONS (JTF 2)

REGIONAL SECURITY & INTEROPERABILITY
HN SUPPORT & SUPPLY COORD
HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE & DISASTER RELIEF
SECURITY ASSISTANCE (E.G. TRAINING, ADVISORS, EQUIPMENT)
POPULACE & RESOURCE CONTROL (REFUGEE/EVAC)
CIVIL AFFAIRS
INTERAGENCY ACTIVITIES
HN SUPPORT FOR JTF
SUSTAINMENT ASSISTANCE
LNOS (ALLIED/COALITION FORCES/MED SPT/ENG SPT)
BILATERAL AGREEMENTS
LNOS TO USG TM/HNG (COORD & ESTAB)

JTF DIRECTION & INTEGRATION (JTF 3)

COMM OPS & PLANS
FREQUENCY COORD
C3CM INTEROPERABILITY (JTF, HN, USG, CINC)
CRYPTOGRAPHY

JTF COMMAND AND CONTROL (JTF 4)

DELIBERATE PLANNING (CAMPAIGN/OPLAN/CONPLAN/OPORDERS)
JTF PLANNING CYCLE
COALITION COORD/LNOS
RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (ROE)
UW & SOF EMPLOYMENT/PSYOPS/CIVIL AFFAIRS OPS
CRISIS ACTION PROCEDURES (CAP)
WWMCCS
STRATEGIC MOBILITY (STRAT MOB) PRIORITIES
JFACC/AIRSPACE C2/AIR APPORTIONMENT
AIRSPACE MGMT
CSAR
OPDEC
TPFDD
JSOTF COORD
COMMAND POSTS
LNO INTEGRATION & SYNCHRONIZATION

JTF INTELLIGENCE (JTF 5)

JT INTEL ACTIVITIES
JT INTEL CTR (JIC)
JT IMAGERY & PHOTO CTR (JIPC)
JT INTEL FACILITIES (JIF)

JTF INTELLIGENCE (JTF 5) CONTINUED

JT MTRL EXPL CTR (JMEC)
JT CNTR-INTEL OPS CTR (JCIOC)
NATIONAL AGENCY DATA EXCHANGE (NSA/CIA/DIA)
LIAISON TO USG, HNG, ALLIES
SVC COMPONENT INTEL EXCHANGE
CRYPTO SPT GRP (CSG)
SIGINT SPT

JTF MOVEMENT AND MANEUVER (JTF 6)

INTRA-THEATER MOVEMENT REQMTS
POSTURE FORCES (OP & TAC FORMATIONS/OPS IN DEPTH/GEOMETRY)
COUNTERMOBILITY
JTF RESERVE

JTF FIRES (JTF 7)

INTEGRATE JT FIRES
JT TARGETING (J-ATO)
ALLOCATE RESOURCES

JTF PROTECTION (JTF 8)

INTEGRATE AIR DEFENSE
ENGINEERING/FORTIFICATIONS
OPSEC (SIGSEC, CONCEALMENT, ETC.)
NBC DEFENSE
DECEPTION PLANNING
ACTIVE/PASSIVE SECURITY MEASURES

JTF SUSTAINMENT (JTF 9)

STRATEGIC MOBILITY LIFT
JT PETROLEUM & FUELS (POL)
JT MED REGULATING OPS (JMRO)
JT BLOOD PROGRAM OPS (JBPO)
THEATER TERRAIN MGMT
JT FACILITIES UTIL BD
JT MATERIAL MGMT
JT CIVIL-MILITARY ENGINEERING
JT EOD
JT ADP SPT
RECONSTITUTION
MANPOWER MGMT
PERSONNEL POLICY
INFORMATION EXCHANGE REQMTS
GENERAL SERVICES
JT GRAVES REGISTRATION (SPTG COMDS)
AWARDS
LEGAL (SOFA, LOW, ROE, UCMJ, ETC.)
MORALE/WELFARE/PERSONAL SVCS
JT PAO

FMM OPERATING SYSTEMS

MARINE AIR-GROUND TASK FORCE
MEF/MEF (FWD)/MEB FUNCTIONS

MEF COMMAND AND CONTROL (MEF 1)

- PLANNING CYCLE
 - CMDRS ROLE
 - DELIBERATE PLANNING
 - RAPID/COMPRESSED PLANNING
 - INTERNAL/EXTERNAL PLANNING
- PLANS (CURRENT & FUTURE)
- PLNG RELATIONSHIPS (MARFOR, JTF, SVCS)
- OPLANS/CONPLANS/SPTG PLANS/CAMPAIGN PLANS
- BUILDUP OF FORCES (TPFDD)
- UW & SOF EMPLOYMENT
- EPW/REFUGEE/EVACUEE EVAC
- TERRAIN MANAGEMENT
- LNO ELEMENTS
- EW 7 CECM (RADIO BN & ACE [EA-6B])
- OPS SOP
- RAOC/RAS
- INTRA-THEATER AIRLIFT
- COMD POSTS
- WWMCCS
- C3CM
 - ESTAB COMMS/COMM PLAN
 - HN & LNO EOMMS
 - DCS/NTS LINKS

MEF INTELLIGENCE (MEF 2)

- INTEL COLLECTION PLNG & MGMT (RECON, SURVEIL, TOPO, SENSORS)
- ALL SOURCE ANALYSIS (MAFC & OCAC)
 - DISSEMINATION
- TARGET INTEL
- HUMINT & COUNTERINTEL
- SIGNALS INTEL (SIGINT) & ELEC WARFARE (EW)
- DEVELOPMENT OF EEI (PIR) & OIR
- LIASION WITH ADJ AND ALLIED UNITS
- IPB

MEF MOVEMENT AND MANEUVER (MEF 3)

- MANEUVER CONTROL
- TACTICAL UNIT MOVEMENTS (POSITION/REPOSITION FORCES)
- INTEGRATE AND SYNCHRONIZE FIRE SUPPORT
- TERRAIN MGMT
- BATTLEFIELD GEOMETRY

MEF AVIATION (MEF 4)

AIR COMD & CONTROL (JFACC/JTF/MAGTF)
AIR SPACE MGMT
TARGETING (ATO/J-ATO)
INTEGRATE AIR DEF
AIR APPORTIONMENT/ALLOCATION & ALLOTMENT
AIR IPB
MAGTF AIR CELL

MEF FIRES AND FIRE SUPPORT (MEF 5)

MEF PLANNING & EXECUTION (FFCC)
TARGETING

MEF MOBILITY AND SURVIVABILITY (MEF 6)

OBSTACLES (BREECH & EMLACE)
EOD
CONSTRUCT & REPAIR (ROADS, AIRFIELDS, LZS, UTILITIES, ETC.)
PASSIVE & ACTIVE SECURITY MEASURES (ECCM, SIGSEC, COMSEC,
CONCEALMENT, CAMOUFLAGE, ETC.)
NBC DEFENSE
DECEPTION

MEF COMBAT SUPPORT (MEF 7)

SUPPLY (CLASSES I-X)
MAINTENANCE
HN LOGISTIC SPT COORD
CSS C2
TRANSPORT (MHE/EMBK/MOTOR-T)
LANDING SPT
FOOD SVCS
HEALTH SVCS (MED/DEN)
GEN ENGINEERING
GEN SVCS (POSTAL/EVACUEE/REFUGEE/EPW/ADP/MP)
ARRIVAL & ASSEMBLY OPS (LOTS/COTS/MPF)
RECONSTITUTION (UNITS, EQUIP & SYSTEMS)
PERSONNEL REPLACEMENT/UNIT ROTATION
TASK ORGANIZATION
RESERVE AUGMENT
CASUALTY EST & SOPS
GRAVES REGISTRATION
EPWS
LEGAL (LOW, SOFA, ROE, UCMJ, ETC.)
ADMIN SVCS
PUBLIC AFFAIRS

SPECTRUM OF CONFLICT AND FMF WARFIGHTING BLUEPRINT INTERFACE

FMF WARFIGHTING BLUEPRINT

[----- OPERATIONAL -----]

[----- TACTICAL -----]

	<u>HQTRS FMF</u>		<u>MAGTFs</u>		<u>MSEs</u>
<u>SPECTRUM OF CONFLICT</u>	MARFOR/FMF	MEF(JTF)	MEF/MEB	MEU	GCE/ACE/CSSE

LIC

STABILITY OPS

PRESENCE
HUM ASST
SCTY OPS
PEACEKEEPING
CN OPS
COIN OPS

LIMITED OBJ

OPS
PT CONT OPS
CT OPS

MIC

CONVENTIONAL OPS ASHORE

HIC

GEN WAR

MARITIME
AMPHIB OPS
LAND CAMPAIGN

* GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS *

- MISSION
- OBJECTIVE
- RISK ASSESSMENT
- CULMINATING POINT
- PRIORITY OF FUNCTIONAL EFFORT
- LIAISON RQMTS
- REQD ADDITIONAL SPT OR AUGMENTATION
- LOGISTIC RQMTS
- INTEL RESOURCE RQMTS/IPB
- CENTER OF GRAVITY
- LINKAGE TO HIGHER, ADJ, SUB & SPT CMDS
- PLANNING CYCLE
- EMPLOYMENT OPTIONS
- ROE
- HN SPT
- POL ECON, DIP & INTER-AGENCY LINKAGE
- METT-T
- DRAWS-D
- C4I2
- COAS
- MOBILITY ASSETS
- OPLANS/CONPLANS/SPTING PLANS
- POME
- PRINCIPALS OF WAR

APPENDIX IV

NOTES

Abstract

1. U.S. Navy Dept., "White Letter...From the Sea," (Washington: 1992), pp. 1-2.
2. U.S. Marine Corps., FMFM 1-1 Campaigning, (Washington: January 1990), pp. 28-29.

Preface

1. While all of these issues may have overshadowed the dilemma concerning MAGTF operational development, it is evident that the MCCDC, Quantico, Va. mechanism for concept and doctrine formulation is the key entity which has been broken and continues to remain in disarray.
2. Indications from MCCDC are that FMFM 2 MAGTF Doctrine (Coordinating Draft) has been removed from consideration as a potential future USMC publication. This draft FMFM incorporated tactical and some operational planning considerations.
3. JCS Pub 3-0, Joint Pub 5-00.1 & Joint Pub 5-00.2
4. John E. Turlington, "Truely Learning the Operational Art," Parameters, Spring 1987, pp. 51-52.

Chapter I

1. U.S. Marine Corps., FMFM 1-1 Campaigning, (Washington: January 1990), pp. 28-29.
2. Dwight L. Adams and Clayton R. Newell, "Operational Art in the Joint and Combined Arenas," Parameters, June 1988, p. 33.
3. U.S. Marine Corps., FMFM 1-1 Campaigning, (Washington: January 1990), p. ii (Forward).
4. Those Marine Corps Gazette articles which touched on the subject are included in the bibliography. The point is that FMFM 1-1 Campaigning has stimulation little in the way of written material on operational art and its posture within the FMF.
5. U.S. Marine Corps., FMFM 1-1 Campaigning, (Washington: January 1990), p. 87.
6. This observation was drawn from discussions with LtGen E.C. Cheatham, USMC (Ret) during the Winter/Spring 1992.
7. Charles C. Krulak, "A Corps of Marines for the Future: Relevant, Ready, Capable," Marine Corps Gazette, June 1992, p. 17.

8. U.S. Navy Dept., "White Letter...From the Sea," (Washington: 1992), p. 12.

9. Dwight L. Adams and Clayton R. Newell, "Operational Art in the Joint and Combined Arenas," Parameters, June 1988, p. 34. A section of this article discusses the Vietnam culture of some Army officers and the effect that it had on doctrine writing. The parallel though is applicable to the Marine Corps.

Chapter II

1. U.S. Marine Corps., FMFRP 12-34-1. History of the U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II, (Washington: 1989), pp. 8-15.

2. Alan R. Millett, Semper Fidelis: The History of the United States Marine Corps (New York: Macmillan, 1980), p. 504.

3. Ibid., p. 504-505 and 514. During most of the Korean conflict the 1st MAF fell under the 5th Air Force.

4. Ibid., pp. 559-565.

5. Dwight L. Adams and Clayton R. Newell, "Operational Art in the Joint and Combined Arenas," Parameters, June 1988, p. 38.

6. Thomas C. Linn, "The Marine Corps and Joint Warfare," Marine Corps Gazette, June 1992, p. 25.

7. Peter D. Kopf, "FMF Doctrine: Status Quo or Revolutionary Approach," Naval War College, October 1992, p. 3.

8. Carl E. Mundy, "Paradox of the Corps: "... such other duties as the President may direct," Marine Corps Gazette, April 1993, p. 16.

9. Walter E. Boomer, "Special Trust and Confidence Amongst the Trail-Breakers," Marine Corps Gazette, November 1991, p. 49.

10. III MEF was tasked with Sea Angel on the heels of Desert Storm in 1991 and more recently I MEF deployed to Somalia to conduct Restore Hope.

11. Charles C. Krulak, "A Corps of Marines for the Future: Relevant, Ready, Capable," Marine Corps Gazette, June 1992, p. 17.

12. I MEF augmentation needs were discussed in phone conversations with members of the MAGTF Instruction Team, MCCDC who deployed to Somalia.

13. John H. Cushman, "Joint, Jointer, Jointest," Naval Proceedings, Naval Review 1992, p. 79.

14. Peter D. Kopf, "FMF Doctrine: Status Quo or Revolutionary Approach," Naval War College, October 1992, p. 3.
15. Ibid., p. 4.
16. Ibid., p. 4.
17. Charles C. Krulak, "A Corps of Marines for the Future: Relevant, Ready, Capable," Marine Corps Gazette, June 1992, p. 14.
18. Walter E. Boomer, "Special Trust and Confidence Amongst the Trail-Breakers," Marine Corps Gazette, November 1991, p. 48.
19. Charles C. Krulak, "A Corps of Marines for the Future: Relevant, Ready, Capable," Marine Corps Gazette, June 1992, p. 17.
17. U.S. Marine Corps msg 011952Z SEP 1992 Marine Corps Service Component Commands, directed the implementation of this initiative.
20. Paul Beaver, "Flash Points," Jane's Defense Weekly, 2 January 1993, pp. 12-19.
21. U.S. Navy Dept., "White Letter...From the Sea," (Washington: 1992), p. 1.
22. Dwight L. Adams and Clayton R. Newell, "Operational Art and the Joint and Combined Arenas," Parameters, June 1988, p. 33. This has been the case in the Army, but in concert with the gist of the paper, hasn't caught on yet in the Marine Corps.
23. Ibid., pp. 33-34.
24. Walter E. Boomer, "Special Trust and Confidence Amongst the Trail-Breakers," Marine Corps Gazette, November 1991, p. 48.
25. The FSPG use the 18th Airborne Corps headquarters T/O as a model for developing the revised MEF CE.
26. John W. Reitz, "Managing the Intellectual Change: Army's Revision of FM 100-5," Army, September 1992, pp. 45-46.
27. U.S. Army. FM 100-5 Operations, (Fort Leavenworth: May 1986), pp. 19-21.
28. U.S. Army, FM 100-15 Corps Operations, (Fort Leavenworth: September 1989), pp. 3-4 - 3-19.
29. Derived from TRADOC Pamphlet 11-9.
30. U.S. Marine Corps. FMFM 2 MAGTF Doctrine (Coordinating Draft), (Washington: Fall 1992), p. 2-8.

31. Marine Corps Gazette, February 1993, p. 4. MajGen Wilhelm assumed the MarFor function and as CG, 1st MarDiv was focused on the role of ground forces.
32. U.S. Marine Corps. FMFM 1-1 Campaigning, (Washington: 1990), p. 64-70.
33. U.S. Marine Corps. FMFM 2 MAGTF Doctrine (Coordinating Draft), (Washington: Fall 1992), p. 4-10.
34. U.S. Marine Corps. FMFM 1 Warfighting, (Washington: 1989), pp. 74-75.
35. Gordon C. O'Neill and Daniel A Driscoll, Jr., "Maneuver Warfare: Can the ACE Adopt This Philosophy of War?" Marine Corps Gazette, May 1991, p. 78.
36. William M. Rakow, "MAGTF Operations With the Fleet in the Year 2000," Marine Corps Gazette, July 1990, pp. 17-19.
37. U.S. Navy Dept., "White Letter... From the Sea," (Washington: 1992), p. 1.
38. Ibid., pp. 1-2.
39. Larry J. Bockman and Bradd C. Hayes, "breathing life Into the Naval Service's New Direction," Marine Corps Gazette, February 1993, p. 49.
40. U.S. Navy Dept., "White Letter... From the Sea," (Washington: 1992), pp. 8-9.
41. Ibid., p. 3.
42. Michael A. Cicere, "The Marine Corps Adopts IPB," Marine Corps Gazette, September 1992, pp. 26-27. The IPB concept might be appropriate to expand to the NEF level and the three dimensional battlespace that naval forces may face in regional contingencies.
43. U.S. Navy Dept., "White Letter... From the Sea," (Washington: 1992), p. 6.
44. John H. Cushman, "Joint. Jointer, Jointest," Naval Proceedings, Naval Review 1992, p. S2.
45. Chairman, JCS. Joint Pub 5-00.2 Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures, (Washington: 1991), pp. IV-1 - IV-5.
46. Ibid., pp. G-2 - G-3.
47. Ibid., pp. H-1 - H-3.

48. John H. Cushman, "Fight as a Team," Naval Proceedings, January 1993, p. 58.

49. U.S. Marine Corps. FMFM 1-1 Campaigning, (Washington: 1990), p. 75.

50. U.S. Marine Corps. FMFM 2 MAGTF Doctrine (Coordinating Draft), (Washington: Fall 1992), pp. 2-8 - 2-11.

51. U.S. Marine Corps. FMFM 1-1 Campaigning, (Washington: 1990), pp. 40-41.

52. FMFM 2 MAGTF Doctrine (Coordinating Draft) incorporated the concept of tactical operating systems. As this draft publication is no longer being considered for publication, it is questionable whether operating systems will resurface in future doctrinal publications.

53. Peter D. Kopf, "FMF Doctrine: Status Quo or Revolutionary Approach," October 1992, p. 16. The author's thesis for this paper centered on the need to revise USMC doctrine development and offered the theoretical use of operating systems as a basis for a new family of FMFMs. This Appendix is a derivative of the Army's Blueprint of the Battlefield. It was designed to illustrate basic USMC operating functional needs.

54. Ibid., pp. 17-22. This Appendix was formulated by mating the FMF Warfighting Blueprint with those staff functions (G/J-1 - G/J-6) listed in FMFM 2 MAGTF Doctrine (Coordinating Draft) figures 5-5 - 5-7. The intent here was to identify a system which would enable the MEF CE to focus and prioritize its efforts toward the integration and synchronization of functions. Both the operational and tactical functions for the MEF CE are listed along with component functions that either the MEF or HQ FMF (in a theater of war) would perform.

55. The Army's Blueprint of the Battlefield delineates operating systems for each level of war. For the FMF it is the author's recommendation that the functions not be similarly designated, as the relationship of the operational and tactical levels need to be fused as a singular methodology.

56. Chairman, JCS. Joint Pub 5-00.2 Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures, (Washington: 1991) pp. 11-3 - 11-8.

57. The considerations listed were extracted from Joint Pub 5-00.2 Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures, Appendix A-G.

Chapter III

1. Marshall K. Snyder, "In Search of Doctrine," Marine Corps Gazette, January 1993, p. 44.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Adams, Dwight L. and Newell, Clayton R. "Operational Art in the Joint and Combined Arenas." Parameters, June 1988, pp. 33-39.
- Anderson, Gary W. "Beyond Mahan: Naval Doctrine in the Post-Cold War World." Marine Corps Gazette, June 1992, pp. 38-41.
- Beaver, Paul "Flash Points." Jane's Defence Weekly, 2 January 1993, pp. 12-19.
- Bierly, Jerome F. and Seal, Thomas E. "Over-the-Horizon Amphibious Operations." Marine Corps Gazette, July 1991, pp. 41-42.
- Bockman, Larry J. and Hayes, Bradd C. "Breathing Life Into the Naval Service's New Direction." Marine Corps Gazette, February 1993, pp. 47-49.
- Boomer, Walter E. "Special Trust and Confidence Amongst the Trail-Breakers." Marine Corps Gazette, November 1991, pp. 47-50.
- Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Doctrine for Unified and Joint Operations (Test Pub). JCS PUB 3-0. Washington: 1990.
- Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Doctrine for Joint Campaign Planning (Initial Draft). JCS PUB 5-00.1. Washington: 1992.
- Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures. JCS PUB 5-00.2. Washington: 1991.
- Cicere, Michael A. "The Marine Corps Adopts IPB." Marine Corps Gazette, September 1992, pp. 26-27.
- Cushman, John H. "Joint, Jointer, Jointest." Naval Proceedings, Naval Review 1992, pp. 78-85.
- Cushman, John H. "Fight as a Team." Naval Proceedings. January 1993, pp. 58-62.
- Donovan, James a. "New Concepts and New Doctrine." Marine Corps Gazette, June 1992, pp. 42-44.
- Giboney, Thomas B. "Commander's Control From Information Chaos." Military Review, November 1991, pp. 34-38.
- Gunzelman, Karl J. "Institutionalizing Airland Battle Doctrine." Marine Corps Gazette, October 1989, pp. 47-49.
- Kopf, Peter D. "FMF Doctrine: Status Quo or Revolutionary Approach." U.S. Naval War College, October 1992.

- Krulak, Charles C. "A Corps of Marines for the Future: Relevant, Ready, Capable." Marine Corps Gazette, June 1992, pp. 14-18.
- Linn, Thomas C. "The Marine Corps and Joint Warfare." Marine Corps Gazette, June 1992, pp. 25-27.
- Medina, Joseph V. "Delineating the Deep Battle." Marine Corps Gazette, June 1992, pp. 32-33.
- Mendel, William W. and Banks, Floyd T. "Campaign Planning: Getting It Straight." Parameters, September 1988, pp. 43-53.
- Millett, Alan R. Semper Fidelis: The History of the United States Marine Corps. New York: MacMillian Publishing Co., 1980.
- Moore, Scott R. "Rethinking the MAGTF." Marine Corps Gazette, June 1992, pp. 20-24.
- Mundy, Carl E. "Paradox of the Corps: "... such other duties as the President may direct." Marine Corps Gazette, April 1993, pp. 16-18.
- Munson, Curtis A. and Lyons, Dwight. "Who Fights the MAGTF." Marine Corps Gazette, June 1992, pp. 28-31.
- O'Neill, Gordon C. and Driscoll, Daniel A. Jr. "Maneuver Warfare: Can the ACE Adopt this Philosophy of War?" Marine Corps Gazette, May 1991, pp. 77-83.
- Pierce, Terry C. "MAGTF Warlords: A Naval Perspective." Marine Corps Gazette, July 1991, pp. 38-40.
- Pugh, Paul F. "Operational Art and Amphibious Warfare." Marine Corps Gazette, July 1991, pp. 81-85.
- Rakow, William M. "MAGTF Operations With the Fleet in the Year 2000." Marine Corps Gazette, July 1990, pp. 17-19.
- Reitz, John W. "Managing Intellectual Change: Army's Revision of FM 100-5." Army, September 1992, pp. 45-47.
- Snyder, Marshall K. "In Search of Doctrine." Marine Corps Gazette, January 1993, pp. 44-45.
- Stenn, Kent O. W. "Airland Battle Future." Marine Corps Gazette, March 1991, pp. 44-46.
- Turlington, John E. "Truly Learning the Operational Art." Parameters, Spring 1987, pp. 51-64.
- Watson, Kenneth C. "What's Happening to Our Doctrine." Marine Corps Gazette, January 1993, pp. 45-47.

- Wilson, G. I. "The Gulf War, Maneuver Warfare, and the Operational Art." Marine Corps Gazette, June 1991, pp. 23-24.
- Wolfowitz, Paul. "Regional Conflicts: New Thinking, Old Policy." Parameters, March 1990, pp. 2-8.
- U.S. Army. FM 100-5 Operations. Fort Leavenworth: May 1986.
- U.S. Army. FM 100-15 Corps Operations. Fort Leavenworth: September 1989.
- U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute. The Operational Art of Warfare Across the Spectrum of Conflict. Carlisle Barracks: 1 February 1987.
- U.S. Combined Forces Command. White Paper: Joint Operations in a Combined Theater. Seoul, Korea: 23 January 1992.
- U.S. Marine Corps. FMFM 1 Tactics. Washington: 1989.
- U.S. Marine Corps. FMFM 1-1 Campaigning. Washington: 1990.
- U.S. Marine Corps. FMFM 1-2 The Role of the Marine Corps in the National Defense. Washington: 1991.
- U.S. Marine Corps. FMFM 2 MAGTF Doctrine (Coordinating Draft). Washington: Fall 1992. (Indications are that this draft publication has recently been removed from consideration as a potential USMC document)
- U.S. Marine Corps. FMFM 3-1 Command and Staff Action. Washington: 1977.
- U.S. Marine Corps. FMFPR 12-34-I to 12-34-V. History of the U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II. Washington: 1989.
- U.S. Marine Corps Msg 011952Z SEP 1992 Marine Corps Service Component Commands. HQMC, Washington: 1992.
- U.S. Navy Dept. White Letter... From the Sea. Washington: 1992.